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Katach: A Tenant's Procedural Due Process Right in Chronic Nuisance Ordia

NOTE
A TENANT'S PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
RIGHT IN CHRONIC NUISANCE
ORDINANCE JURISDICTIONS
I.

INTRODUCTION

On May 2, 2012, Lakisha Briggs, a thirty-three-year-old African
American single mother, and resident of Norristown, Pennsylvania,
returned to her rented home to find her ex-boyfriend, Wilbert Bennett,
associating with some unknown individuals in the alleyway near her
home.' After chasing her down the alley with a brick, Bennett followed
Briggs to her home and began to beat her.2 Upon receiving an
anonymous call, the police arrived at the rental home, and Bennett ran
into the house to hide.3 Briggs was found on the front porch of the home
wearing only a bra. 4 She did not tell the officers that Bennett had ripped
her shirt off, that she was involved in an altercation,5 or that Bennett was
in the house. 6 After the police entered her home, they removed Bennett
from the house, and both Briggs and Bennett were cited for disorderly
conduct 7 and fighting.8
At first, Briggs neglected to inform the police about Bennett and the
altercation because she knew what might occur if the police cited her for
any disorderly behavior. 9 Despite the clear signs that she was a victim of
domestic violence, the police cited Briggs anyway.' 0 This was Briggs's
1. Verified Second Amended Complaint
27, 68, Briggs v. Borough of Norristown, No.
2:13-cv-2191 (E.D. Pa. filed Oct. 3, 2013) [hereinafter Verified Second Amended Complaint].
2. Id. 69.
3. Id. 70.
4. Id. 71.
5. Id. 71-72.
6. Id. 72.
7. Disorderly conduct, when characterized as such by the Norristown Police Department, is
included in the Norristown Chronic Nuisance Ordinance's ("CNO") definition of "disorderly
behavior." BOROUGH OF NORRISTOWN, PA., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 245, art. I, § 245-3(B) (2012).
8. Verified Second Amended Complaint, supranote 1, 74.

9. ld 72.
10. Id.

71-72, 74.
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final strike, pushing her over the three-strike nuisance threshold of
Norristown's Chronic Nuisance Ordinance ("CNO"). 11 Together with
two previous incidents between Bennett and Briggs, this occurrence gave
the City of Norristown the authority to begin license revocation
proceedings against Briggs's landlord, Darren Sudman.12
On May 23, 2013, Briggs accompanied her landlord to a hearing in
front of Norristown borough officials. 13 At the hearing, the officials
discussed whether Sudman's rental license should be suspended or
revoked for surpassing the three-strike Norristown CNO threshold,
which would thereby revoke Briggs's tenancy. 14 The hearing lasted
approximately thirty minutes; no official record, transcript, or minutes
were kept, and no one appeared to be the designated fact finder.' 5
Although Briggs tried to describe the circumstances surrounding the
three strikes at the hearing, she was interrupted.' 6 After allowing
Sudman to speak briefly about the benefits of having Briggs as his
tenant, the officials issued a letter decision placing Sudman's property
on thirty-day probation.' 7 Further, the letter stated that any more
violations of the Norristown CNO would result in the suspension or
revocation of Sudman's rental license, thereby evicting Briggs from her
home.' 8 Implicitly, this meant that any future calls to the police from that
property would lead to Briggs' eviction. 19
Norristown is one of the many cities that have adopted this type of
CNO. 20 These ordinances have gained popularity in the more heavily

11. Id.
51-55, 58-64, 68-74 (discussing the three times police were called to Briggs'
property, which were also the three strikes in violation of the CNO); BOROUGH OF NORRISTOWN,
PA., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 245, art. I, § 245-3(C)-(E).
12. BOROUGH OF NORRISTOWN, PA., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 245, art. I, § 245-3(E) (repealed
Nov. 7, 2012) (codifying a license revocation procedure upon violation of the CNO); Verified
Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, 39, 47, 51-55, 58-64, 68-74.
13. Verified Second Amended Complaint, supra note I, 76.
14. NORRISTOWN, MUNICIPAL CODE § 245-3(E) (repealed Nov. 7, 2012) (providing the
borough officials with the discretion to revoke a landlord's rental license revocation when the CNO
is violated); Verified Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, 99 75-76.
15. Verified Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, 78.
16. Id. 80.
17. Id. 81-82, 84.
18. Id. IM85-86.
19. Id. 986.
20. See BOROUGH OF NORRISTOWN, PA., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 245, art. I, §§ 245-1 to -4
(2012); BEAVERTON, OR., CITY CODE ch. 5.07, §§ 5.07.005-.100 (2014); MILWAUKEE, WIS., CODE
OF ORDINANCES ch. 80, § 80-10 (2001); MUNDELEIN, ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 9.76,
§§ 9.76.010-.070 (2000); TOWN OF PHILLIPSBURG, N.J., CODE ch. 441, §§ 441-1 to -6 (2005);
PITTSBURGH, PA., CODE OF ORDINANCES art. VII, ch. 670, §§ 670.01-.07 (2007); L.A., CAL.,
MUNICIPAL CODE art. 2, § 12.27.1 (2009); PHX., ARIZ., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 23, art. I, div. 2, § 2311 (1962); SAN DIEGO, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 1, art. 2, div. 6, §§ 12.0601-.0614 (1993);
DALL. COUNTY, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES pt. 1, ch. 34, art. III, div. 3, §§ 34-141 to -144 (1991).
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populated states.21 In jurisdictions that have CNOs, if police officers are
contacted and report to a landlord's property more than three times in
sixty days, the property is declared a chronic nuisance, and the landlord
is charged the cost of the police services for additional police
correspondence.2 ' A landlord can avoid paying these fees if she abates
the nuisance.23 Often, this means evicting the tenant.2 4 Some CNOs
expressly incentivize eviction,25 while others continue to impose
penalties on the landlord until she has no choice but to evict the tenant.26
CNOs were created to recover the cost of excessive police
services, and to encourage property owners to prevent criminal activity
from occurring on their properties.27 Even though the laws ultimately
achieve their desired goal,28 they do so at the expense of the

21. Matthew Desmond & Nicol Valdez, Online Supplement to Unpolicing the Urban Poor:
Consequences of Third-Party Policingfor Inner-City Women, 78 AM. Soc. REV. 4, 5 (2013)
(finding that CNOs can be found in the more heavily populated cities like Los Angeles, California;
Chicago, Illinois; Phoenix, Arizona; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; San Diego, California; Dallas,
Texas; and Detroit, Michigan).
22. See, e.g., MILWAUKEE, WIS., § 80-10-3(a-1) (stating that the chief of police can declare a
property a nuisance after responding to three or more nuisance activities within a thirty-day period);
id. § 80-10-1 (providing the chief of police with the authority to charge the owners of nusiance
premises the costs associated with abating such CNO violations). The ordinances differ as to what
actions constitute violations. See TOWN/VILLAGE OF EAST ROCHESTER, N.Y., CODE ch. 144, § 14413-A(5)(a) (2009) (stating that the landlord's rental license can be revoked after three or more police
responses within a twelve-month period); TOWN OF BLOOMSBURG, PA., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 6, pt.
6, § 6-606 (2003) (stating that a landlord is charged the police service costs after two or more police
responses in a thirty-day period); PITTSBURGH, PA., § 670.02(b) (stating that the Director of Public
Safety can declare a property a "Disruptive Property" after three or more on-site arrests,
summonses, or citations are made within a 180-day period); SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE,
tit. 10, ch. 10.09, § 10.09.030-A (2009) (stating that the chief of police can declare a property a
nuisance after the occurrence of three or more nuisance activities within a sixty-day period).
23. See, e.g., PITTSBURGH, PA., § 670.02(e) (pardoning a landlord from future fees as soon as
as an eviction process is initiated against a tenant).
24. Memorandum from Mike Sanford, Assistant Chief, Seattle Police Dep't, to Pub. Safety
and Educ. Comm. 4-5 (Feb. 9, 2011), available at http://clerk.ci.seattle.wa.us/-public/
meetingrecords/201 1/pse20110216_2a.pdf.
25. See, e.g., NORRISTOWN, PA., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 245, art. I, § 245-3(F) (incentivizing
the landlord to begin the eviction process so that strikes incurred during the eviction proceedings
will not reflect negatively against the property); YORK, PA., CODIFIED ORDINANCES pt. 17, tit. 3, art.
1751, § 1751.06(b) (2012) (notifying the landlord that initiating the eviction process will be
weighed positively by the City in determining whether to remove nuisance points against the
property).
26. See, e.g., MILWAUKEE, WIS., § 80-10-6(b) (imposing fines between $1000 and $5000 for
failure to abate the nuisance activity); BLOOMSBURG, PA., § 6-605 (imposing a fine of up to $1000
after a landlord is convicted of owning a property where a "disorderly gathering" occurred); EAST
ROCHESTER, N.Y., § 144-14 (imposing a fine of up to $250 per CNO violation); SEATTLE, WASH.,
§ 10.09.050 (imposing fines of up to $500 per day until the chief of police confirms that the property
is no longer a chronic nuisance property).
27. BLOOMSBURG, PA., § 6-601(A), (D), (F); MILWAUKEE, WIS., § 80-10-1.
28. See, e.g., Memorandum from Mike Sanford, supranote 24, at 2.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2015

3

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 9

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:875

tenant's legal interests,29 which are important and should not be
overlooked or undermined.3 °
As can be seen in the Briggs case, only a landlord can contest the
nuisance status of her property. 3I Flaws in CNOs do not permit a tenant
who is being evicted from her residence to do the same.32 A tenant
cannot contest the property's nuisance status,33 contest any officers'
citations,34 or retain tenancy until she is convicted of the criminal
offense. 35 Therefore, it is possible for the tenant to be found not guilty in
the criminal case against her, and still lose her tenancy. 36 This is a direct
breach of the tenant's Fourteenth Amendment rights.37
The drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment found it essential to
provide citizens with an opportunity to contest any deprivation of a
liberty or property interest by the state.38 The Supreme Court, when
interpreting this Amendment, determined that procedural due process,
at a minimum, requires notice and an opportunity to be heard.3 9 Such
an interpretation 40applies to each and every deprivation of a liberty or
property interest.

29. Letter from Katherine E. Walz et al., Shriver Ctr. Dir., to Code and Regulation Comm.,
Rockford City Council 4-6 (Dec. 3, 2012), available at http://povertylaw.org/sites/default/files/
webfiles/Letter/o20to%2ORockford%20on%2ORental%2OProperty/o2ORegistration%20and%2OChr
onic%20Nuisance%200rdinance.pdf (discussing the housing rights, privacy rights, and due process
rights of tenants in CNO jurisdictions).
30. See infra Part IL.A-B.
31. See Verified Second Amended Complaint, supranote 1, 179 (complaining that the new
and repealed CNOs do not provide the tenant with notice of the CNO violation, an opportunity to
contest the chief of police's discretionary decision to characterize the incident as "disorderly
behavior," or an opportunity to contest the borough's decision to enforce the ordinance against the
landlord); BOROUGH OF NORRISTOWN, PA., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 245, art. I, §§ 245-3(C)-(E)
(2012) (providing only the landlord with notice and an opportunity to remedy the nuisance);
PITTSBURGH, PA., CODE OF ORDINANCES art. VIU, ch. 670, § 670.05(a) (2007); MILWAUKEE, WIS.,

§§ 80-10-2-d, -2-e, -3-c.
32. Letter from Katherine E. Walz, supra note 29, at 5-6 (stating that the Rockford City CNO
fails to provide tenants with sufficient procedural due process in its failure to afford them "adequate
notice and an opportunity to challenge the basis for the City's enforcement efforts before a neutral
decision-maker").
33. See Verified Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, 179.
34. See id.
35.

See, e.g., CITY OF YORK, PA., CODIFIED ORDINANCES pt. 17, tit. 3, art. 1751, § 1751.04

(2012).
36. See, e.g., id.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Letter from Katherine E. Walz, supra note 29, at
5-6 (stating that the Rockford City CNO fails to provide tenants with sufficient process, considering
the important housing interest at stake and potential consequences of an eviction).
38. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-33 (1976).
39. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
40. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313.
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Tenants in CNO jurisdictions are losing their property and liberty
interests without regard for the necessary consideration of relevant
factors. 4' While other tenants in similar situations would receive the
benefit of some sort of hearing before or after they are deprived of their
interest, 42 tenants in jurisdictions that have enacted CNOs are left with
their tongues tied 43 and the negative stigma of "evicted" on their credit
reports. 44 On their faces, these ordinances impinge upon a tenant's
constitutional right to challenge a taking of the tenant's legal interest. 45
Part II of this Note will begin by introducing the history of CNOs
and their role in overall public nuisance containment. 46 Next, this Note
will look at sample CNOs, and will discuss some of the apparent
differences between current ordinance structures.4 7 Part III of this Note
will introduce the Mathews v. Eldridge48 factors that must be weighed
when determining the amount of process a person must receive before
her legal interest can be usurped by a state. 49 After introducing the
Mathews factors, this Note will weigh a tenant's interest in additional
procedural safeguards against the municipality's burden in providing
these additional safeguards. 5 ° Finally, after concluding that additional
procedural safeguards for tenants would not be too heavy a burden on
municipalities, Part IV of this Note will introduce a reformed CNO,
intended to provide tenants with a constitutionally sufficient amount of
process, while retaining the initial intent of the CNO.i

41. See infra Part III.A-B.
42. See, e.g., Colvin v. Hous. Auth., 71 F.3d 864, 867 (11 th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
43. See I Am Not a Nuisance: Local Ordinances Punish Victims of Crime, ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/womens-rights/i-am-not-nuisance-local-ordinances-punish-victims-crime
(last
visited Apr. 12, 2015). It has been noted that:
Because these ordinances typically do not require that residents be told about a warning
or citation, impacted people often have no opportunity to show that they were actually
victims of the "nuisance conduct" and may not even know that a nuisance ordinance is at
the root of their housing situation.
Id.
44. Bethy Hardeman, How Does an Eviction Affect My Credit?, CREDIT KARMA (Mar. 28,
2013), https://blog.creditkarma.com/credit- 101/credit-report/how-does-an-eviction-affect-my-credit.
45. See infra Part ll.B.
46. See infra Part ll.A.
47. See infta Part ll.B.
48. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
49. See infra Part HI.A.
50. See infra Part III.B.
51. See infra Part IV.
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In order to understand how CNOs deny a tenant her procedural due
52
process right, this Part will provide a brief history of their origin.
CNOs are the result of a blend between the common law public nuisance
doctrine and the power of the municipality to collect the cost of public
services from private citizens. 3 Subpart A will explain the history of
CNOs, from their inception in common law to their current status as civil
trials against tenants who are denied their due process constitutional
rights.54 Subpart B will identify various CNOs and will discuss some of
the differences between them. 5
A.

History of Chronic Nuisance Ordinances
56
Public nuisance laws, which originated from the common law,
were used by the representatives of state governments to prosecute
actions against individuals who unreasonably interfered with a "right
common to the general public. '57 The modem laws derive from the
common law doctrine of "nuisance. 58 The difficulty with the nuisance
doctrine is that it is entirely undefined and complex. 59 It has been
described as "the great grab bag, the dust bin, of the law, 60 because
nearly any interference can be described as a nuisance.6 1 Currently, it is
used by the courts as a catch-all term to describe a defendant's
interference with a plaintiffs interest. 62 The doctrine has been used to
describe a range of issues from alarming advertisements to a cockroach
found in baked goods.6 3
The nuisance doctrine originated in English law, and was originally
used to describe a defendant's interference with the plaintiffs free
use of her own land.64 At the time, only a private individual whose
52. See infra Part H.A.
53. Cari Fais, Note, Denying Access to Justice: The Cost of Applying Chronic Nuisance Laws
to Domestic Violence, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 1181, 1184 (2008).
54. See infra Part II.A.
55. See infra Part l.B.
56.

W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 617 (5th ed.

1984).
57. B.A. Glesner, Landlords as Cops: Tort, Nuisance & Forfeiture Standards Imposing
Liability on Landlordsfor Crime on the Premises, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 679, 716-17 (1992).
58. KEETON ETAL., supra note 56, at 617.
59. See id.at 616. W. Page Keeton and William Prosser have gone as far as to say, "it is
incapable of any exact or comprehensive definition." Id.
60. Glesner, supranote 57, at 716.
61. See 58 AM. JUR. 2D NUISANCES § 1 (2012).
62. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 56, at 617.
63. Id.at 616.
64. Id.at 617.
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interests were usurped was able to sue for the loss of her right of
way or damages. 65 This later became known as the doctrine of
private nuisance.66
During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the nuisance doctrine
was expanded to those actions that interfered with the King's real
property rights, usually a public highway or watercourse. 6 ' There was
enough of a resemblance between obstructing a private person's use of
her own property and obstructing the public's use of a public highway
for the latter to also constitute a nuisance.6 8 These instances were later
distinguished from private nuisances, and were reclassified as the
doctrine of public nuisance. 69 The difference between the two doctrines
was, and still is, the entity that is injured and the entity that is given the
right to sue for the injury.70 In the case of public nuisance, the remedy is
reserved for the state. 7 1 At common law, the venue for obtaining this
remedy was criminal court,
since "a public nuisance was always a crime,
72
and punishable as such.
Since the public nuisance doctrine was broad, and a violation would
affect a community of people, it encompassed a vast number of
interferences.73 Throughout the years, more and more interferences were
declared a public nuisance, thereby expanding its definition. 4
Ultimately, the definition became "conduct [that] involves a significant
interference with the public health, the public safety, the public peace,
the public comfort, or the public convenience., 75 Today, all jurisdictions
have codified the common law doctrine of public nuisance into broad
criminal statutes.76
Originally, these laws were used to control prostitution and the sale
of alcohol.77 Today, they are used to inhibit the use of property for a
variety of illegal purposes. 78 Since ths
these laws are written so broadly, in
65. Id.; Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass ProductsLiability Tort, 71 U. CIN. L.
REV. 741, 792 (2003).
66. KEETON ET AL., supra note 56, at 617.
67. Gifford, supranote 65, at 793.
68. KEETON ET AL., supra note 56, at 617.
69. Id.
70. Id. at618.
71. Id.
72. Id.at 643,645.
73. Id. at 643.
74. Id. at 643-45.
75.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2)(a) (2000).

76. KEETON ET AL., supra note 56, at 646.
77. Glesner, supranote 57, at 717.
78. See id; see also Joseph P. Fried, City Uses Its Anti-Nuisance Law to Try to Close Chop
Shops, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1984, at 41 (noting the use of nuisance law to "shut down auto-repair
and salvage businesses that double as chop shops in which stolen cars are dismantled so their parts
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the leasing context, they can affect the tenant who causes the nuisance,
and the landlord who fails to stop the tenant from doing SO. 7 9 For
example, in Rhode Island, landlords or tenants can be held responsible
for nuisance activity if they knowingly allowed such activity to occur
within a tenement while it was under their control.8 0 Penalties for
violating the statute can range as high as a $1000 fine or a sixty-day
prison sentence for either the tenant or the landlord. 81 In New York, the
tenant or landlord can be guilty of a Class-B misdemeanor for
"knowingly conduct[ing] or maintain[ing] any premises.., where
persons gather for purposes of engaging in unlawful conduct. ' '82 The
federal "crack house statute"8 3 has the same effect on tenants and
landlords alike.84 It criminalizes anyone who "knowingly open[s],
lease[s], rent[s], use[s] or maintain[s] any place, whether permanently or
temporarily, for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, or using any
controlled substance., 85 CNOs, similar to their public nuisance statute
counterparts, were created to prevent such nuisances,86only without the
hassle of waiting for a judicial nuisance determination.
A CNO derives its authority from a state's police
powers.8 7 However, ordinances created under the exercise of state police
power-zoning
ordinances,
for
example-"must
be
88
are
exercised
within
constitutional
limits."
Ordinances
constitutional as long as they provide for adequate procedure and
are reasonable. 89 Therefore, "at a minimum, an ordinance
must provide for notice and an opportunity to be heard." 90
In the following Parts, this Note will discuss the shortcomings
can be resold"); Judge in Los Angeles OrdersStreet Gangs to Erase Graffiti, N.Y. TIMES, July 24,
1982, at 28 (noting the use of nuisance law to issue a Temporary Restraining Order compelling
eighty gang members to remove graffiti from walls and store fronts); Now, Cities Hit Drug Suspects
Where They Live, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1991, at B 16 (noting the use of nuisance law to close down a
hotel used by drug dealers to distribute cocaine).
79. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.45(2) (McKinney 2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-30-7
(2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-43-10 (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-3-101(b) (1980); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 47-1-1 (1989).
80. GEN. LAWS § 11-30-7.
81.

Id.

82.
83.
84.
85.

PENAL § 240.45(2).
Fais, supra note 53, at 1185.
21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. 2005).
Id.

86.

See, e.g., CITY OF YORK, PA., CODIFIED ORDINANCES

pt. 17, tit. 3,

art.

1751,

§ 1751.01 (a)-(b) (2012); Los ANGELES, CA., MUNICIPAL CODE § 12.27.1 (A).
87. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Police Court of Sacramento, 251 U.S. 22, 25 (1919).
88. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 514 (1977).
89. Alex Cameron, Comment, Due Process and Local Administrative Hearings Regulating
PublicNuisances:Analysis andReform, 43 ST. MARY'S L.J. 619, 629 (2012).

90. Id.; see United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 48 (1993).
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of CNOs in meeting such
are, thus, unconstitutional. 91

a

standard,

and

why

they

B. Examples of Chronic Nuisance Ordinances
CNOs were created to recover the cost of excessive police services,
and to force landlords to take action to stop nuisances from reoccurring
on their property. 92 The majority of CNOs work in the same way. After a
tenant or property owner calls the police numerous times, under any
circumstances, an official-usually the chief of police in the
municipality or county-will notify the property owner that further
phone calls will result in either a fine for the owner or an eviction for the
tenant.93 However, CNOs vary, and some contain exceptions or
characteristics that others lack.94
Some CNOs require a conviction before the citation can be tallied
to the ordinance's threshold. 95 Other CNOs either do not wait for the
citation to turn into a conviction,9 6 or do not require a citation or arrest to
be made at all. 97 With regard to domestic violence disputes, some
CNOs exempt such violations,98 while others tally every instance of
police contact. 99
CNOs also differ with regard to penalization.' 00 In Pittsburgh, for
example, the local CNO offers incentives to landlords for initiating the
eviction process against the tenant.' 0 ' Another jurisdiction bars the

91.

See infra Parts III-IV.
See, e.g., BEAVERTON, OR., CITY CODE ch. 5.07, §§ 5.07.010(C)-(D) (1998);
MILWAUKEE, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 80, § 80-10-1 (2001); TOWN OF PHILLIPSBURG, N.J.,
CODE ch. 441, § 441-1(A) (2005); PITTSBURGH, PA., CODE OF ORDINANCES art. VII, ch. 670,
§ 670.01 (2007).
93. See, e.g., BOROUGH OF NORRISTOWN, PA., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 245, art. I, §§ 245-3(3)(E) (2012). Other CNOs expressly list which actions will be counted as a violation under the
ordinance. See, e.g., BEAVERTON, OR., §5.07.020(B); MILWAUKEE, WIS., §80-10-2-c;
PITTSBURGH, PA., § 670.02(a).
94. See infra notes 95-116 and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., WILKES-BARRE, PA., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 7, art. VII, § 7-219 (2005); see
also TOWN/VILLAGE OF EAST ROCHESTER, N.Y., CODE ch. 144, § 144-13(A)(5)(a) (2009) (stating
that ordinance is considered violated when "at least one of [the three] public nuisance violations
hav[e] resulted in a conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction").
96. See, e.g., CITY OF YORK, PA., CODIFIED ORDINANCES pt. 17, tit. 3, art. 1751, § 1751.04
(2012).
97. See, e.g., TOWN OF BLOOMSBURG, PA., MUNICIPAL CODE, ch. 6, pt. 6, § 6-606 (2003).
98. See, e.g., TOWN OF PHILLIPSBURG, N.J., CODE ch. 441, § 44 1-1(B) (2005).
99. See, e.g., BOROUGH OF NORRISTOWN, PA., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 245, art. 1, § 2453(B3)(I )(b)(5) (2012).
100. See infra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
101. See CITY OF PITTSBURGH, PA., CODE OF ORDINANCES art. VII, ch. 670, § 670.02(e)
(2007).
92.
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landlord from renting out the property to an alternative tenant.1 °2 While
some statutes charge the landlord a hefty fine when the CNO is
violated, 0 3 others threaten to entirely1 5 revoke a landlord's rental
license, °4 or even sentence her to prison. 0
CNOs also differ with regard to the number of police calls required
before a violation of the ordinance occurs. 10 6 While most CNOs
expressly state the number of calls one needs to make to violate the
ordinance, 1°7 some do not set a threshold, leaving the landlord and tenant
wondering when the last strike will occur.10 8 One CNO, the Nuisance
Abatement Ordinance in York, Pennsylvania, determines strikes
differently than most other nuisance ordinances.10 9 According to York's
CNO, every time the police are contacted regarding certain listed crimes,
the property is assigned a number of points."10 The points are
accumulated against the property until the total surpasses the CNO's
point threshold."' However,1 2 points are removed one year after the
occurrence of each violation.
The final common difference worth noting is the detail with which
offenses are detailed in the statutes, or lack thereof." 3 Some CNOs lay
out in great detail all of the offenses that, when committed, violate the
ordinance. 4 Others continue to use broad terminology to encompass

102.

See EMILY WERTH, SHRIVER CTR., THE COST OF BEING "CRIME FREE:" LEGAL AND

PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIME FREE RENTAL HOuSING AND NUISANCE PROPERTY
ORDINANCES 4 (2013), available at http://povertylaw.org/sites/default/files/files/housingjustice/cost-of-being-crime-free.pdf
103. See, e.g., MILWAUKEE, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 80, § 80-10-3-e-5 (2001)
(imposing fines as large as $5000 for the landlord's failure to abate a nuisance).
104. TOWN/VILLAGE OF EAST ROCHESTER, N.Y., CODE ch. 144, § 144-13(A)(5) (2009). Before
the initiation of Briggs's lawsuit, the Borough of Norristown ("Borough" or "Norristown") would
revoke the landlord's rental license when the ordinance was violated three times. See BOROUGH OF
NORRISTOWN, PA., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 245, art. I, § 245-3(E) (repealed Nov. 7, 2012). After the
lawsuit was initiated, the municipality amended the ordinance by removing the revocation provision,
and simply imposing a hefty fine on the landlord in the event of three violations. See BOROUGH OF
NORRISTOWN, PA., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 245, art. I, § 245-3(E) (2012).
105. See CITY OF WILKES-BARRE, PA., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 7, art. VII, §§ 7-240(b)(1)(3) (2005); CITY OF YORK, PA., CODIFIED ORDINANCES pt. 17, tit. 3, art. 1751, § 1751.99(c) (2012).
106. See infra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
107.

See, e.g., MILWAUKEE, WIS., § 80-10-3-a-1; TOWN OF BLOOMSBURG, PA., MUNICIPAL

CODE ch. 6, pt. 6, §6-607 (2003).
See, e.g., SAN DIEGO, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 1, art. 2, div. 6, § 12.0602 (1993).
109. CITY OF YORK, PA., § 1751.02.
110. Id.
Ill. Id.
112. Id. § 1751.09.
113. See infra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., BEAVERTON, OR., CITY CODE ch. 5.07, §5.07.020(B) (1998); PITTSBURGH, PA.,
CODE OF ORDINANCES art. VII, ch. 670, § 670.02(a) (2007); MILWAUKEE, WIS., CODE OF
ORDINANCES ch. 80, § 80-10-2 (2001).
108.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol43/iss3/9

10

Katach: A Tenant's Procedural Due Process Right in Chronic Nuisance Ordia

2015]

CHRONIC NUISANCE ORDINANCE

any action a municipality would later decide to term a "public
disturbance," similar to their common law cousin.115 Overall,
municipalities and police departments are extremely partial to such
ordinances because they improve the quality of life for tenants, relieve
some of the costs of police services, and encourage landlords
to be more
16
active with the conduct that occurs on their property. 1
1. Borough of Norristown, Pennsylvania
In the Borough of Norristown ("Borough" or "Norristown"), the
landlord, as the holder of the rental license, is responsible for assuring
that her tenants, their family members, and their guests, do not engage in
"disorderly behavior" in the residence.' 17 As seen in the Briggs case, the
Borough may threaten to revoke a landlord's rental license in the event
that the ordinance is violated.1 18 Although the Borough has amended its
ordinance to remove the revocation penalty, the amended version still
fails to clarify the definition of "disorderly behavior." 1 9 Because the
Norristown CNO still does not define the term adequately or expressly
list the crimes that qualify, 120 Norristown landlords and tenants continue
to be dumbfounded as to what conduct constitutes "disorderly
behavior."12'
This confusion causes tenants and landlords to
continuously question whether a police call will count as a strike. 122 This
is especially problematic because, in addition to failing to receive notice
before a tenant is evicted, the tenant cannot predict when her conduct is
"disorderly," and cannot defend a citation that she has no notice of in
eviction proceedings. 23 Additionally, like many other CNOs, this CNO
calls for the chief of police's sole decision as to whether an act is
considered "disorderly behavior."' 1 4 This is problematic because the
unreviewable decision of the chief of police can be entirely subjective
115. See TOWN OF BLOOMSBURG, PA., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 6, pt. 6, § 6-602 (2003)
(penalizing any "conduct which otherwise disturbs, annoys, injures or endangers the health, safety
or welfare of the residents of the Town of Bloomsburg").
116. See Fais, supra note 53, at 1190.
117. See BOROUGH OF NORRISTOWN, PA., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 245, art. I, § 245-3(B) (2012).
118.

See BOROUGH OF NORRISTOWN, PA., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 245, art. I,

§ 245-3(E)

(repealed Nov. 7, 2012); Verified Second Amended Complaint, supranote 1, 76.
119. See NORRISTOWN, PA., §§ 245-3(B)(1)(a)-(b); Verified Second Amended Complaint,
supranote 1, 209.
120. NORRISTOWN, PA., § 245-3(B)(1); Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss at 55-56, Briggs v. Borough of Norristown, No. 2:13-cv-2191 (E.D. Pa. June 3,
2013) [hereinafter Motion to Dismiss].
121. See Motion to Dismiss, supra note 120, at 56.
122. See supranote 43 and accompanying text.
123. See NORRISTOWN, PA., §§ 245-3(B)(1), (C)-(E); Verified Second Amended Complaint,
supra note 1, 209-16.
124. NORRISTOWN, PA., § 245-3(C).
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and unjustified. 125 This may cause innocent citizens to lose their
tenancy, perhaps, because the chief of police was not too fond of them in
126
the first place.
After the chief of police receives a notification of "disorderly
behavior" committed on, or in relation to, the property, she is only
required to provide the licensee-the landlord-with notice of the
ordinance strike.127 When the CNO is violated a second time, the chief of
police must direct the landlord to submit a written report "of all action
taken by the licensee since the first violation notice and actions the
licensee intends to take to prevent further disorderly behavior" within ten
days. 28 The licensee's failure to submit the required report can lead to a
fine of up to $1000, if convicted by a competent court. 29 This provides
an incentive for the landlord to evict a disruptive tenant in order to avoid
hefty fines, no matter how much the tenant begs to remain in their
homes. 30 One should also note that only the landlord receives notice and
an opportunity to remedy the situation.' 3' The tenant, on the other hand,
will not know that the chief of police considered any conduct "disorderly
behavior" until later informed by the landlord, or until an eviction
proceeding is initiated. 32 Additionally, the municipality incentivizes
eviction of a disruptive tenant by providing the landlord with immunity
against future statutory violations33 by the tenant if the landlord "diligently
pursue[s]" the eviction process.
Furthermore, the Norristown CNO encourages landlords to act in a
manner that many would consider illegal or immoral. 134 For example, the
CNO asks landlords: (1) to include terms within their leases that would
allow the landlord to evict a tenant in the event of a violation of the
125. Id.; see City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 64 (1999) (striking down a state statute
against gang member loitering because it "affords too much discretion to the police").
126. See Verified Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, $ 211 (complaining that the chief
of police has unlimited discretion to determine what conduct violated the CNO and, thus, could be
using said discretion arbitrarily and discriminatorily).
127. NORRISTOWN, PA., § 245-3(C).
128. Id.§ 245-3(D).
129. Id. §§ 245-3(D), (K)(3).
130. Fais, supranote 53, at 1200.
131.

NORRISTOWN, PA. § 245-3(C)-(E) (stating that the licensee, namely the landlord, is the

only person with the right to receive notice of the strike, and an opportunity to remedy the nuisance
from future violations).
132. Id.; Verified Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, 64-65.
133. NORRISTOWN, PA., § 245-3(F).
134. Id. § 245-3(J) (encouraging landlords to conduct criminal background checks on their
prospective tenants because they could be a "nuisance"); Letter from Katherine E. Walz, supra note
29, at 5 (noting that the rejection of a tenant's application because they have a criminal record for
violation of a CNO will have a "disparate racial and ethnic impact because African Americans and
Latinos have disproportionally more contact with the criminal justice system... when compared to
the general population").
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CNO; and (2) to conduct background checks on prospective tenants
before agreeing to lease the property to them. 35 Another ordinance
136
demands that the landlord use a "crime-free lease" with her tenants.
This is an agreement that
makes criminal (and sometimes other) activity by tenants, their
household members, their guests, and other specified third parties a
violation of the lease that can be the basis for an eviction.... [Its]
provisions might address (among other things): the sort of criminal or
other conduct that violates the lease; where criminal or other conduct
must occur in order to violate the lease; the responsibility of the tenant
for conduct of third parties, regardless of the tenant's knowledge of or
ability to control that conduct; and/or the
37 standard for proving that
conduct violating the lease has occurred. 1
With a broad statutory interpretation, 38 the chief of police's sole
decision-making discretion,139 and a limited amount of procedural
safeguards, 140 the municipality is able to "pull the wool over the tenant's
eyes.' 4 1 Tenants, like Briggs, are left to decide whether to call the police
and exhaust a potential strike, 42 or to handle the nuisance on their
own. 143 The Norristown CNO does not provide the tenant with an
opportunity to contest the officer's determination, receive notice of the
shortcomings, or assist in the prevention of future violations. 144
2. Seattle, Washington
In 2009, Seattle, Washington enacted its own CNO. 145 Although
Seattle's CNO provides tenants with notice after "nuisance activity" is
committed on the property,146 it has a few peculiarities that allow the
municipality to take control of the problem. 47 After the chief of police
declares the property a "Chronic Nuisance Property," and the landlord or
tenant fails to respond to the notification of the violations, "the Chief of

135.

NORRISTOWN, PA.,

§§

245-3()-J).

136. See Werth, supra note 102, at 3.
137.

Id.

138. NORRISTOWN, PA., § 245-3(B)(1)(b) (stating that any activity that could be characterized
as disorderly in nature can be considered a strike).
139. See id. § 245-3(C).
140. See id. §§ 245-3(C)-(E) (proscribing procedural due process rights to the licensee only).
141. See Verified Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1,
175-80 (noting that Briggs'
legal interests are being usurped without providing her with sufficient procedural due process).
142. See id. 139.
143. See id. 66-67.
144. SeeNORRISTOWN, PA., §§ 245-3(C)-(E).
145. SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE tit. 10, ch. 10.09, §§ 10.09.010-.090 (2009).
146. See id.§§ 10.09.010(8), .030(A).
147. See id.§ 10.09.060.
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Police may refer the matter to the City Attorney for initiation
proceedings.,148 The City Attorney can then "initiate an action in any
149
court of competent jurisdiction to abate a chronic nuisance property."
This action would result in the municipality directly evicting the tenant,
as opposed to allowing the landlord and the tenant to mediate the dispute
on their own. 50 If the landlord fails to remedy the nuisance on her own,
she could face a civil penalty. 5 ' If the low base penalty does not provide
the landlord with an incentive to evict the tenant, larger penalties may
apply, which certainly should provide encouragement. 152 The ordinance
also goes as far as expressly stating which evidence is admissible in
54 thereby
court proceedings, 53 and what remedies a court may utilize,'
55
evidence.
of
rules
typical
court's
the
potentially bypassing
Additionally, Seattle's CNO contains a unique enforcement
provision. 56 It states that in the event an innocent tenant is evicted due
to the nuisance activity of her roommate, she will receive $3300 in
relocation funds.' 57 This provision is problematic in many ways. 158 First,
it assumes that $3300 in funds would suffice for a complete
relocation. 59 Second, it assumes that the innocent roommate can find
60
living quarters elsewhere either at a rent less than or equal to her rent.'
Finally, it assumes that the innocent tenant has no personal ties to the
property she is currently living in and would be able to maintain her
lifestyle in her new home. 161 One can imagine a hypothetical where an
innocent roommate has lived in a certain area because of communal
ties. 162 Forcing this person to relocate could cause her undue hardship
because of lack of funding or availability of housing. 163 Additionally, it
is possible that she would have to leave her job due to a long commute to
148. Seeid § 10.09.030(D).
149. See id.§ 10.09.060.
150. See id. Once the City Attorney gets involved, coming to a settlement agreement becomes
increasingly more difficult. See id.
151. See id. § 10.09.080(B).
152. See id. §§ 10.09.050(A), .080(B) (stating the largest penalty that can be incurred is
$25,000).
153. Seeid. § 10.09.070.
154. See id.§§ 10.09.080-.090.
155. See id.
§ 10.09.085(A).
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See infra notes 159-65 and accompanying text.
159. SEATTLE, WASH., § 10.09.085(A).
160. Id; Erik Eckholm, Victims' Dilemma: 911 Calls Can Bring Eviction, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
17, 2013, at Al.
161. See Andrew Scherer, Gideon's Shelter: The Need to Recognize a Right to Counselfor
Indigent Defendants in Eviction Procedures,23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 557, 564-65 (1988).

162.

See id

163.

See id.
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889

and from work, merely because her nuisance-prone roommate could not
refrain from being disruptive.' 64 In the direst
circumstances, an innocent
165
roommate could even end up homeless.
In Seattle, a memorandum was issued from the Assistant to the
Chief of Police to the Public Safety and Education Committee,
discussing the overall effect of the city's CNO in 2010.166 Aside from
listing all of the properties that are currently on nuisance "watch," or that
will be prospectively considered a nuisance property, 167 the document
also describes many of the issues that the city has with its CNO. 168 One
issue is that the financial penalties that are imposed on the landlords are
inadequate,1 69 because many of the landlords are poverty stricken and do
not have the means to resolve the nuisance activities. 170 Thus, many
"property owner[s] ha[ve] little incentive to resolve the nuisance
activities to avoid a fine if they are already in financial trouble."' 7 1 These
landlords may simply continue holding on to the property until they are
either forced to sell it, or vacate the home by order of the court.172
Another issue with Seattle's CNO is that it fails to notify potential
buyers of the cited property about pending violations.173 Since the
ordinance leaves the landlord in charge, as opposed to placing a lien on
the property, 174 the landlord can be considered to have remediated the
nuisance by simply selling the property. 175 The report also indicated that
a large number of landlords have simply evicted their tenants as soon as
they receive notice of a citation. 176 This evinces that some ordinances
177
require significant revision to be more effective and constitutional.

164.

Seeid.

165.

Seeid.

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

See Memorandum from Mike Sanford, supra note 24, at1.
See id.at3.
See id.at4-5.
See id. at5.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

175. See id.This issue has been resolved under the York, Pennsylvania, ordinance by causing
violations of the CNO to act as an encumbrance on the property. See CITY OF YORK, PA., CODIFIED
ORDINANCES pt. 17, tit. 3, art. 1751, § 1751.10 (2012).
176. Memorandum from Mike Sanford, supranote 24, at 4.
177. See id. at 4-5; Letter from Katherine E. Walz, supra note 29, at 5-6 (listing a few statutory
modifications that could be added to Rockford City's CNO to make it procedurally sound).
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C. Validity of Ordinances
Although a municipality retains broad discretion in deciding what
conduct constitutes a public nuisance-broadly defined as any action
that is "detrimental to the health, morals, peace or general welfare of its
78
citizens"-its regulations are still restricted by the U.S. Constitution.
Despite the municipality's broad discretion, its ordinances must still be
179
free from unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious governmental action.
Therefore, when a municipality creates an ordinance that may terminate
a preexisting activity, "process requirements of notice and opportunity
for hearing must be satisfied."' 180 On their faces, many CNOs fail to
provide tenants with notice and an opportunity to be heard' 8 1-indicating
they are invalid as a matter of constitutional law. 82 However, to
determine whether a court will declare a certain CNO unconstitutional,
we must analyze the ordinance using the applicable balancing test. 183
III. MATHEWS V. ELDRIDGE BALANCING WEIGHS IN FAVOR OF
ADDITIONAL PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS SAFEGUARDS FOR TENANTS
IN CHRONIC NUISANCE ORDINANCE JURISDICTIONS
The U.S. Supreme Court has said: "When protected interests are
implicated, the right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount.' 1 84 In
Fuentes v. Shevin, 185 the Supreme Court stated that "[a]ny significant
taking of property by the State is within the purview of the Due Process
Clause.' 86 Two years earlier, the Court decided Goldberg v. Kelly.'87 In
Goldberg, the Court addressed the issue of "whether a State that
terminates public assistance payments to a particular recipient without
affording him the opportunity for an evidentiary hearing prior to
termination denies the recipient procedural due process in violation of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."' 88 The Court
178. L. Mark Walker & Dale E. Cottingham, An Abridged Primer on the Law of Public
Nuisance, 30 TULSA L.J. 355, 360-61 (1994).

179.

Id.

180. Id.
181. See, e.g., BOROUGH OF NORRISTOWN, PA., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 245, art. I, §§ 245-3(C)-

(E) (2012).
182. Id. (providing only the licensee with notice and an opportunity to be heard); Walker &
Cottingham, supra note 178, at 360 (stating that notice and an opportunity for a hearing are required
in order to satisfy due process); Letter from Katherine E. WaIz, supra note 29, at 5-6.
183. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 11 (1991); Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981).

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972).
407 U.S. 67 (1972).
Id. at 86.
397 U.S. 254 (1970).
ld. at 255.
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ultimately concluded that a person losing her public assistance rights is
entitled to a pre-termination hearing because of her "brutal need" 189 for
the funds.1 90
The decision is better known for the detailed safeguards the Court
set out in dicta rather than its holding.19 1 The Court stated that, in the
event a person has the "brutal need" for the object right being usurped,
the following procedural safeguards must be included in legislation to
satisfy the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment: a right to notice;
an opportunity to be heard; a right to confront your accuser; a right to
retain counsel; a right to an impartial judge; and a right to an opinion as
to the court's final decision. 92 Although the Court set a high threshold
for procedural due process, it failed to deliver a test for courts to apply
when determining whether a person is entitled to these procedural
rights.' 93 Five years later, in Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court created a
much-needed procedural due process test, which helped courts determine
the minimum safeguards
required when a citizen is being deprived of
94
liberty or property. 1
Mathews has been used by many judges and legal scholars to
determine the span of an individual's due process rights in situations
where a federal or state government is trying to deprive the individual of
a legal interest.1 95 In Mathews, the court prescribed three factors that
should be weighed to determine the amount of process that a sovereign
must provide to a citizen. 196 The court listed the factors as follows:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional.., procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative 97burdens that the additional ...procedural requirement
would entail. 1

189. Id. at 261, 264 (applying the "brutal need" terminology to welfare recipients because
welfare provides them with the means to "obtain essential food, clothing, housing, and medical
care... termination of [such] aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive
an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits").
190. Id.at261.
191. Id. at267-71.
192. Id.
193. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 101-02 (1972).
194. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
195. See, e.g., United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53 (1993);
Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 11 (1991); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,
542-43 (1985); Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981).
196. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35.
197. Id. at 335.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2015

17

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 9

892

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:875

In the CNO context, if the three factors, when considered in conjunction,
weigh in favor of additional procedural safeguards, then a municipality's
ordinance is unconstitutional, and the municipality is obligated to add
safeguards to its codified ordinance. 198 When weighing a tenant's rights
against the sovereign's rights, it is immediately apparent that CNOs are
usurping a tenant's property and liberty rights without providing her
with the necessary procedural safeguards. 99 The remaining Subparts of
Part III will discuss the three Mathews factors, and provide some
information about the case that established the balancing test."'
A. Tenants Are at Risk of Losing Liberty and PropertyInterests
The first factor of the Mathews test asks what type of interest is
being usurped by the municipality's activity. 2 1 A tenant who does not
receive notice or an opportunity to be heard may face unjust eviction,
thereby putting her tenancy and her liberty at risk.20 2 These interests
constitute liberty and property interests that must be protected through
procedural safeguards.2 °3
1. Liberty Interest
The Court has determined that the liberty interest discussed in the
Fourteenth Amendment is broad. 2°4 Given the Court's broad definition, it
is not difficult to see how tenants have a liberty interest in completing
their contractual duties with their landlords. 2 5 A right to liberty is not
only the right to be free from "bodily restraint," 20 6 but also includes "the
right of the citizen ... to use [his faculties] in all lawful ways, to live and
work where she will; to earn her livelihood by any lawful calling; [and]
to pursue any lawful trade or vocation. 2 7 All laws that prohibit a person

198. See id.
199. See infra Part III.B.
200. See infra Part HI.
201. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
202. See Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 450-51 (1982); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 571-72 (1972).
203. See infra Part III.A. 1-2.
204. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 572.
205. See id. (defining "liberty" to include freedom from bodily restraints, and the the rights to
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, and to
worship God). Such a broad definition must include a tenant's right to contract and satisfy a
contractual duty with her landlord over her tenancy. See id
206. Id. (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
207. Scherer, supra note 161, at 567 (internal quotations marks omitted) (citing Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897)).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol43/iss3/9

18

Katach: A Tenant's Procedural Due Process Right in Chronic Nuisance Ordia

2015]

CHRONIC NUISANCE ORDINANCE

from acting on these rights are "infringements upon his 20fundamental
8
rights of liberty, which are under constitutional protection.
A very possible consequence of eviction-due to a violation of a
CNO-is likely to be homelessness. 20 9 The homeless are "potentially
subject to the loss of their physical liberty through incarceration and
institutionalization. ' '210 Because they are helpless, these civilians are
exposed to conditions that severely prohibit their ability to enjoy their
"fundamental rights of liberty." 211 They undergo severe emotional and
psychological trauma, and can also be exposed to family separation, loss
of parental rights, and loss of reputation or esteem.2 12
2. Property Interest
Many courts have recognized that a person's tenancy in land is a
protected property interest. 2 " The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that
"[t]he right of a tenant to continued occupancy of his home is a
traditionally recognized property right., 214 In Lindsey v. Normet,215 for
example, the Court assumed that a periodic, month-to-month tenancy is a
property interest meriting Fourteenth Amendment protections.2 6 In
Greene v. Lindsey,21 1 the Court recognized that tenants "[had] been
deprived of a significant interest in property: indeed, of the right to
continued residence in their homes. 2 18 In Almota Farmers Elevator &
Warehouse Co. v. United States,219 the Court held that lease renewals are
interests that must be accounted for in condemnation proceedings. 220 The
protections that states afford tenants pursuant to their leases further
indicates that a tenancy is a property interest.221 After signing a lease,
tenants are entitled to a right of possession,222 a covenant of quiet

208. Id.
209. See id.
at 568.
210. Id.at 567.
211. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
212. See Ken Karas, Recognizing a Right to Counsel for Indigent Tenants in Eviction
Proceedings in New York, 24 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 527, 546 (1991); Scherer, supra note
161, at 569.
213. See, e.g., Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444,450-51 (1982).
214.

Scherer, supra note 161, at 564; see also ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., LAW OF

PROPERTY § 6.11 (1984) (describing a tenant's property interest as "an estate in land in the strictest
sense").
215. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
216. See id. at 72, 74.
217. 456 U.S. 444 (1982).
218. Id at 451.
219. 409 U.S. 470 (1973).
220. Id. at 473-74.
221. See CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supranote 214, §§ 6.21-22, 6.30, 6.39.
222. See id. §§ 6.21-22.
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enjoyment, 223 an implied warranty of habitability, 224 and notice
requirements in certain situations.225
One legal scholar suggested that one's tenancy interest deserves
additional constitutional protection when she is a member of an
impoverished class.226 Another scholar noted: "While each tenant has a

strong interest in maintaining her current residence, poverty magnifies
the importance of protecting one's property from seizure by legal
process. ,,227 Therefore, "as the lower income housing market continues
to shrink, there will be a greater need to safeguard the property interests
of those currently occupying dwellings. 228
Court decisions and legal articles discussing the various interests of
the tenant in her tenancy 229 make it clear that there is a great interest at
risk when a municipality attempts to take the tenancy away without the
necessary procedural safeguards. 230 For some, this deprivation could lead
232 and a broken family. 233
to homelessness, 23 1 emotional turmoil,
Therefore, regardless of whether it is a property interest or a liberty
interest, one thing is clear: tenancy is a right that cannot be usurped
without some form of procedural protection.234
B. Tenants Under the Threat of Eviction Will Suffer GreatDamage in
the Event that a Decision Is Erroneously Made Against Them
The second factor of the Mathews test asks what the risk of
erroneous deprivation is. 235 What would be the consequences of a
wrongful decision in favor of the municipality in eviction proceedings,
and how difficult would it be to reverse such consequences? 236 Since a
tenant has no right to contest the property's declaration as a nuisance or
a strike upon its receipt, 221 she may risk losing her home before being

223.

See id. § 6.30; ROBERT S. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT

§ 3:3 (1980 & Supp. 1989).
224.
225.
226.

See CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 214, § 6.39; SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 223, § 3:16.
See SCHOSH1INSKI, supranote 223, §§ 2:9-:10.
See Karas, supra note 212, at 545.

227. Id. (internal quotations marks omitted).
228. Id.
229. See supraPart III.A.1-2.
230. Seesupra Part UI.A.1-2.
231. See supranotes 210-12 and accompanying text.
232. See supranote 212 and accompanying text.
233. See supranote 212 and accompanying text.

234. See supraPart III.A.1-2.
235. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
236. See id.; Letter from Katherine E. Walz, supra note 29, at 5-6.
237. See, e.g., BOROUGH OF NORRISTOWN, PA., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 245, art. I, §§ 245-3(C)(E) (2012).
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convicted if the landlord refuses to appeal the property declaration, or if
the landlord begins to evict her to avoid fines and incarceration.23 8
Therefore, there is a great chance that a tenant, who was not involved in,
or convicted of, any of the citations, can be evicted without having an
opportunity to contest the accusations against her. 239 This risk is
heightened further in CNO jurisdictions where the municipality does not
require a police citation or a court decision before initiating the
abatement process against a tenant. 240 Also, there is a high risk that an
erroneous decision is likely to mistakenly put an impoverished family on
the streets. 241 Thus, we must also consider the many consequences that
may result from a family being left homeless.242
If a tenant does not receive notice of "disruptive conduct," she
cannot take the necessary actions to change her conduct in order to keep
her residence.243 Nor can the tenant contest whether her conduct truly
qualifies as "disruptive," as per the abstract term used by the CNO in her
jurisdiction. 2 " She must live her life questioning which of her actions
will ultimately be considered "disruptive," or which citation was "the
last straw., 245 Another disadvantage the tenant faces is that a landlord
can submit an abatement plan against the tenant in the event she is not
246
satisfied with the terms of the lease agreement or the tenant ehrself.
For example, a landlord can intentionally withhold the submission of an
abatement plan from the municipality because she knows that the
municipality will take action to abate the nuisance on its own.247

238. See, e.g., CINCINNATI, OHIO, CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. VII, ch. 761, § 761-7(a) (2011);
PrrSBURGH, PA., CODE OF ORDINANCES art. VII ch. 670, §§ 670.02(e), 670.05(a)-(c) (2007); CITY
OF YORK, PA., CODIFIED ORDINANCES pt. 17, tit. 3, art. 1751, § 1751.04 (2012). But see WILKESBARRE, PA., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 7, art. VII, § 7-219 (2005) (requiring a citation to be

successfully prosecuted or a guilty-plea entered before it could be counted as a strike).
239. See, e.g., YORK, § 1751.04; Eckholm, supra note 160; Letter from Katherine E. Walz,
supra note 29, at 4.
240. See, e.g., YORK, § 1751.04.
241. Scherer, supranote 161, at 564-65.
242. See supranotes 210-13 and accompanying text.
243. See, e.g., NORRISTOWN, PA., § 245-3(C)-(E) (noting that only the licensee receives notice
209-16 (complaining that the
of a strike); Verified Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1,
CNO fails to provide sufficient notice as to what conduct constitutes "disorderly behavior").
244. See, e.g., PITTSBURGH, PA., CODE OF ORDINANCES art. VII, ch. 670, § 670.05(a) (2007)
(providing only the owner with notice and an opportunity to contest the strike).
245. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 120, at 56; see also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,

112 (1968) ("It is an established rule that a statute which leaves an ordinary man so doubtful about
its meaning that he cannot know when he has violated it denies him the first essential of due

process.").
246. See, e.g., NORRISTOWN, PA., § 245-3(D) (noting that only the person with the license
permitting the property to be rented out can submit an abatement plan).
247. See SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE tit. 10, ch. 10.09, § 10.09.060 (2009).
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If the tenant, or her attorney, does not receive an opportunity to
cross-examine the main witness, namely the officer or chief of police,
eviction proceedings may be initiated against her unjustly. 248 One can

imagine a hypothetical where an officer "has it in" for a persistent code
violator. 249 Relying on a CNO, an officer could declare any of the
tenant's actions to be disruptive conduct.25 °
There is a grave risk of an erroneous decision when considering the
potential for homelessness, incarceration, abuse of discretion, and the
deprivation of physical liberty. 251 Therefore, to counteract these serious
risks, Mathews demands the imposition of procedural safeguards that
will decrease the possibility of erroneous deprivations. 2 Thus, the
greater the risk a citizen would be subject to in the event of an erroneous
decision, the more procedural safeguards that will be necessary to satisfy
the citizen's due process rights.2 53
C. Municipalities Will Not Incur Great Fiscaland Administrative
Burdens by Implementing Additional ProceduralSafeguards
The final step of the Mathews test is balancing the parties'
interests.254 The burden being imposed on the governmental body
255
"depends on the nature of the added procedural requirement."
Therefore, we must weigh the costs and benefits of an additional
procedural safeguard against its consequential burden on the
municipality. 256 This is no simple task. It requires the balancing of
several factors to come to a conclusion that may create ripples
throughout the traditional actions of a municipality in the nuisance
abatement process.257

248.

See NoRRISTOWN, PA., §§ 245-3(C)-(E) (failing to provide the tenant with an opportunity

to be heard, or an opportunity to cross-examine the chief of police); Verified Second Amended
Complaint, supra note 1,

211 (complaining that the chief of police's unlimited discretion to

determine what conduct violates the CNO could be used to enforce the CNO arbitrarily and
discriminatorily); see also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) ("Cross-examination is the
principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested.").
249. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
250. See supranote 247 and accompanying text.
251. See supranotes 238-51 and accompanying text.
252. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
253. See id.
254. Id.at 335.

255. Cameron, supranote 89, at 640-41.
256. Id.at 640.
257. See id.
at641.
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To start, some of a municipality's recognizable interests are "the
administration of justice, the just and equitable distribution of finite
financial resources, and ... the health, safety and welfare of its
citizens., 258 Another concern is the availability of police services for a
troubled civilian--one who did not fail to take action to remediate or
avoid subsequent nuisances. 9 Some of these interests are even shared
with a tenant, such as achieving a fair resolution to the dispute.26 °
A municipality's main interest is how much money is being spent
on properties where nuisances are chronically a problem. 261 Additional
procedural safeguards would increase these costs, and increase the time
it would take to abate a nuisance.26 2 However, the Mathews Court stated
that "[f]inancial cost alone is not a controlling weight in determining
whether due process requires a particular procedural safeguard prior to
some administrative decision. 2 63 Therefore, the slight increase in costs
is not a proper excuse for a failure to provide for the necessary
procedural safeguards.264 A municipality's second greatest concern is
expending additional police funds between the time of the additional
26
safeguards and the inevitable eviction. 65 It is foreseeable that police
funds that would not have been expended otherwise, would be expended
266 These are all
to provide the tenant additional procedural safeguards.
267
factors that must be balanced in the Mathews test.
In order to best weigh a jurisdiction's potential costs in adding
supplemental procedural safeguards, we must determine what safeguards
268
should be added and whether they will overburden the jurisdiction.
The Mathews test simply requires safeguards proportional to, and that
take into account, the interest at risk and chances of error. 269 The next
Part of this Note will discuss the tenant's side of the Mathews balancing
test and will introduce safeguards that can be added to an invalid CNO
that would make it constitutionally sound.27 °

258. Scherer, supranote 161, at 576.
259. See, e.g., TOWN OF BLOOMSBURG, PA., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 6, pt. 6, § 6-601(A) (2003).
260. See Scherer, supranote 161, at 576.
261. See, e.g., TOWN OF PH{ILLIPSBURG, N.J., CODE ch. 441, § 441-1 (2005); MILWAUKEE,
WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 80, § 80-10-1 (2001).
262. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347 (1976).
263. Id.at 348.
264. See id.
265. Cf id at 347 (applying the same issue with a delay in removing one's welfare benefits,
namely the cost incurred in providing benefits pending a final decision).
266. See id.
267. See id. at 335, 347.
268. See id. at 347; infra Part IV.
269. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35.
270. See infra Part TV.
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IV. CHRONIC NUISANCE ORDINANCE STATUTES CAN BE
CONSTITUTIONALLY UPHELD WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF FEW
PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that "it is fundamental that,
except in emergency situations ... due process requires that, when a
State seeks to terminate an interest ...it must afford notice and

opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case before the
termination becomes effective. 27 1 Since municipalities currently provide
tenants with virtually no procedural safeguards,272 their current fiscal and
administrative burdens are very low. 273 At this time, tenants do not
receive notice of a CNO strike or notice that the property was declared a
chronic nuisance.274 Nor do tenants receive an opportunity to be included
in the abatement process, contest the property's classification, or contest
the strike.2 75 Finally, tenants do not have the opportunity to appeal the
police decision on the property's declaration, or to appeal the
determination that the tenants' conduct was "disruptive. 276 Therefore,
they are being deprived of property without being given an opportunity
to be heard.277 The following Subparts will list the various
safeguards that would resolve the above-mentioned shortcomings, while
still taking into account the relative burdens the additional safeguards
will have on a municipality.2 78
A.

The Relatively Cheap Cost of Notice Makes It a Viable and
EssentialProceduralSafeguard

Notice is a constitutional procedural right that must be provided to
citizens whose interests are to be deprived.27 9 In Mullane v. Hanover,28 °
the Supreme Court held that notice must be "reasonably calculated.., to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them

271. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted).
272. See supra Part l.B.
273. See, e.g., PITrSBURGH, PA., CODE OF ORDINANCES art. VII, ch. 670, §§ 670.03(a), .05
(2007); MILWAUKEE, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 80, § 80-10-3(c) (2001).
274. Verified Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1,
179; see BOROUGH OF
NORRISTOWN, PA., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 245, art. I, §§ 245-3(C)-(E) (2012); PITTSBURGH, PA.,
§ 670.03(a).
275. Verified Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1,
179; see NORRISTOWN, PA.,
§§ 245-3(C)-E.
276. See, e.g., PrrTSBURGH, PA., § 670.05 (noting that only the property owner has these
opportunities).
277. See supra Part III.A.
278. See infra Part IV.A-C.
279. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
280. Id.
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an opportunity to present their objections. ' 281 Therefore, one can infer
from Mullane and Mathews that the greater the interest, the greater the

importance of notice for the deprived party. 282 As mentioned above, in
CNO jurisdictions, only the owner is provided with written notice
regarding the chronic nuisance status of her property.283 Property owners
are informed about the time and place of the disruptive conduct, the
outcome of the chief of police's declaration, and potential consequences

of repeated action, and they are given an opportunity to suggest a
method of remediation.284 A tenant, however, does not receive such

notice. 2858 It is possible that the first time a tenant is notified about her
disruptive behavior, or the property's nuisance status, is at the time of
her eviction proceeding.286 Considering the constitutional necessity of
287.
211
notice, 8 and the relatively cheap cost of delivering notice,
it would

not be a hefty burden on a municipality to deliver a copy of the notice to
the tenant's last known place of residence. 289 This will make the tenant

aware that her conduct was declared "disruptive," and will advise her of
the conduct that cannot be repeated for the remainder of her tenancy.290
A court can also hold the tenant accountable for her misconduct when it
can prove that she received notice that her conduct was previously
declared "disruptive., 29 1 Notice will also inform an innocent roommate
of a cohabitant's disruptive conduct and will make her aware

281. Id.at 314.
282. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976); Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
283. See supra notes 275-77 and accompanying text.
284. See SEATILE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE tit. 10, ch. 10.09, §§ 10.09.030(A)(i)-(5) (2009).
285. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
286. See, e.g., PITTSBURGH, PA., CODE OF ORDINANCES art. VII, ch. 670, § 670.03(a) (2007);
BOROUGH OF NORRISTOWN, PA., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 245, art. 1,§ 245-3(C) (2012).
287. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313.
288. See Tulsa Prof'l Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 490 (1988) ("We have
repeatedly recognized that mail service is an inexpensive and efficient mechanism that is reasonably
calculated to provide actual notice."); Cent. Trust Co. v. Jensen, 616 N.E.2d 873, 876 (Ohio 1993)
("When a party's address is known or easily ascertainable and the cost of notice is little more than
that of a first-class stamp, the balance will almost always favor notice by mail over publication.").
289. See Tulsa, 485 U.S. at 490; Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313; Cent. Trust Co., 616 N.E.2d at 876.
290. See MARK S. RHODES, ORFIELD'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES
§ 42:24 (1987); Verified Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1,
209-16 (complaining that
the CNO does not properly provide citizens with notice as to what conduct constitutes "disorderly
behavior," which could be fixed by providing the tenant with written notice of the strike as soon as
the landlord receives same).
291. Cf 40 AM. JUR. 2D HIGHWAYS, STREETS, AND BRIDGES § 439 (2d ed. 2008) (stating that a
municipality is only accountable for personal injury damages after receipt of actual or constructive
notice of a faulty sidewalk).
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that she could potentially lose her place of residence.292 This will provide
the innocent tenant with an opportunity to discuss this issue with her
roommate, or to begin searching for a new residence.29 3
A judge utilizing the Mathews test is likely to make a number of
determinations: there is a serious interest at risk when evicting a
tenant;294 a person whose interest is being usurped is entitled to some
form of notice; 295 there are great benefits to a tenant's receipt of notice; it
would be a grave injustice for a tenant to not receive any notice; 296 there
is relatively no burden on a municipality to provide the tenant with
notice; 297 and a tenant would not be able to remediate a nuisance after
the first or second strike without the proper notice.298 After considering
all of the above factors, and balancing them in the Mathews test, a court
is likely to conclude that the factors weigh in favor of the tenant, and that
there is no sufficient reason for a municipality to avoid providing notice
to the tenant.299
To incorporate the required notice to a tenant into a constitutionally
valid ordinance, the law should include the following modifications, as
has been done in the Seattle CNO. 300 First, it should describe the notice
requirement as follows: "After declaring conduct as 'disruptive' or
declaring property to be a Chronic Nuisance, the chief of police shall
provide written notice of said declarations to the persons in charge of the
property., 30 1 Second, the statute should define "person in charge" as "an
individual, group of individuals, corporation, partnership, association,
club, company, business trust, joint venture, organization, or any other
legal or commercial entity or the manager, lessee, agent, officer or
employee of any of them. 30 2 Third, notice should be provided after each
disruptive conduct strike and following the chief of police's declaration
that the property is a chronic nuisance.30 3 Finally, notice should state the

292. See Eckholm, supranote 160, at Al.
293. See id.; cf Verified Second Amended Complaint, supranote 1, 57.
294. See supra Part HIA.
295. See supranotes 280-83 and accompanying text.
296. See supranotes 291-94 and accompanying text.
297. See supranotes 289-90 and accompanying text.
298. See supranote 290 and accompanying text.
299. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); supra notes 289-90 and
accompanying text; supraPart III.A.
300. SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE tit. 10, ch. 10.09, § 10.09.030A (2009).
301. Id.
302.
303.

SEATTLE, WASH., §§ 10.09.010(7)-(8).
See supranote 274 and accompanying text.
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time and place of the disruptive conduct, the outcome of the chief of
police's declaration, the potential consequences of repeated action, and
an opportunity to suggest a method of remediation, as it does for the
landlord. 30 4 The Seattle CNO's notice requirement is ideal, because it
provides tenants with sufficient notice of a strike, and a property
declaration at the lowest cost to the municipality, specifically the cost of
paper and a stamp. 3 These changes will provide a tenant, as a "person
in charge," with: notice of any strikes; notice of the property's
classification as a chronic nuisance property; information about which
conduct resulted in the strike, thereby informing them that such conduct
cannot be repeated; and notice of an opportunity to suggest a method of
remediation.3 °6 Courts would not be able to strike down a CNO with
these procedural requirements for failure to provide sufficient notice to
the affected party.30 7
B. ForMany ChronicNuisance Ordinance Statutes Already in Place,
Permittinga Hearing on the Merits Before the Eviction ProcessBegins
Will Make the Statute More Cost Effective and ConstitutionallySound
In Mathews, the Court stated, "the fundamental requirement of due
process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner."' 30 8 Therefore, it is not only important for a tenant
to be heard, but the hearing should also come at the correct time.30 9
Currently, in CNO jurisdictions, a tenant is not provided with an
opportunity to be heard until she finds herself in the midst of eviction
proceedings. 310 By then, the landlord has had an opportunity to discuss
remediation with the municipality. 31 1 During this remediation process,
the tenant was forced to wait until the landlord returned with the
municipality's final determination.1 2 Ideally, a tenant should be able to
defend himself before the eviction process begins. However, this would

304.

SEATTLE, WASH., §§ 10.09.030(A)(1)-(5).

305. See supra notes 279-99 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 291-94, 301-04 and accompanying text.
307. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1950).
308. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S.
545, 552 (1965)).
309. See id.
310. See, e.g., BOROUGH OF NORRISTOWN, PA., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 245, art. 1, §§ 245-3(C)(E) (2012).
311.

See, e.g., NORRISTOWN, PA., §§ 245-3(D)-(E); PITTSBURGH, PA., CODE OF ORDINANCES

art. VII, ch. 670, § 670.04(a) (2007).
312. See, e.g., NORRISTOWN, PA, §§ 245-3(D)-(E); PITTSBURGH, PA., § 670.04(a).
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mean that either the tenant would be allowed to convey this information
during the meeting between the municipality officials and the
landlord,313 or at an entirely separate hearing before the eviction
proceeding begins.314
The latter suggestion can be dismissed immediately because it
would imply delaying an eviction proceeding, and increasing the costs of
litigation. 3' 5 A separate, newly created hearing would certainly weigh the
Mathews scale in favor of the municipality not providing more process,
considering the heavy cost burden,3 16 and the fact that the tenant would
still have an opportunity to plead her defenses to the judge before her
residency is terminated.317
The former suggestion would not work either. The tenant's
presence at the remediation hearing would only bring her frustration. 3 18
This is because the entire event would be a one-sided plea.319 Imagine
the scenario if a tenant joined the meeting between the landlord and the
municipality officials after violating the CNO a few times. What could a
tenant possibly say that would convince the municipality officials to
allow her to keep her residency? She would likely agree to anything the
municipality officials suggest because she does not hold a great amount
of bargaining power. 320 There is also the possibility that the officials are
likely to be biased against her, since, in their minds, she is a nuisance
that is wasting the municipality's time and money. 32 1 No defense or
explanation will give her a fair hearing with the municipality officials.322
With the above options declared inefficient, we are left with two
potential solutions, both of which are already practiced by many of the
CNO jurisdictions.3 23 The options are either to wait for the citation to
turn into a conviction before the eviction process begins,3324 or to entirely

313.

Cf Verified Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1,

76, 80.

314. Cf Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (holding that a pre-termination hearing is
necessary, and should be held, before a civilian loses her welfare benefits).
315. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347 (1976).
316. See id.
317. See COLLEEN K. SANSON, 44 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 449 (2010).
318. See, e.g., Verified Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, $$ 76-86.
319. See id.
320. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079-80 (D.C. Cir. 1970). This would
be similar to a "take it or leave it" situation. See id.
321. See, e.g., TOWN OF PHILLIPSBURG, N.J., CODE ch. 441, §§ 441-l(A)(l)-(6) (2005).
322. See Verified Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1,%7 76-86.
323. See infra notes 327-32 and accompanying text.
324. See, e.g., WILKES-BARRE, PA., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 7, art. VII, § 7-219 (2005); see
also TOWN/VILLAGE OF EAST ROCHESTER, N.Y., CODE ch. 144, § 144-13-A(5)(a) (2009) (stating
that the ordinance is considered violated when "at least one of [the three] public nuisance violations
hav[e] resulted in a conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction").
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forego an early hearing, simply leaving the tenant's hearing to the judge
at the eviction proceedings.325 Obviously, the first option would provide
a tenant with more process and would only cost the municipality time.326
The latter option may be legal, since it continues to provide the tenant
with notice and an opportunity to be heard,32 7 but it would also cause the
initiation of eviction proceedings against tenants who have not yet been
convicted of a crime or of true disruptive conduct.328 Ideally,
municipalities should codify the first option because it guarantees that
the tenant being evicted truly violated the ordinance.32 9
A judge utilizing the Mathews test is likely to recognize that there is
a great interest at risk,330 and that the early and unjustified initiation of
eviction proceedings against an innocent tenant is likely to cost her a lot
of time, money,33 1 and mental anguish.332 Finally, a judge is likely to
balance those facts against the relatively low burden on a municipality
in delaying the eviction initiation process until the tenant is convicted
for all of her citations.333 After considering all of the above factors and
balancing them using the Mathews test, a court is likely to conclude that
the factors weigh in favor of the tenant receiving some increased
process, and that there is no sufficient reason for a municipality to begin
the eviction process without waiting for the three strikes to turn
into convictions.334
In order to resolve this issue, a municipality can simply adopt the
CNO conviction requirement statute that is already utilized by many
CNO jurisdictions. 335 For example, the CNO in Wilkes-Barre,
Pennsylvania, provides tenants with sufficient procedural safeguards by
stating: "In order for such disruptive conduct to constitute an offense
under this article, a citation or criminal complaint must be issued by the

325.

See, e.g.,
TOWN OF BLOOMSBURG, PA., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 6, pt.6, § 6-606 (2003)

(noting that the owner must pay for the police services upon the second strike without an
opportunity to contest the strike).
326. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347 (1976); supra note 324 and accompanying
text.
327. See supranote 323 and accompanying text.
328. See CITY OF YORK, PA., CODIFIED ORDINANCES pt. 17, tit. 3, art. 1751, § 1751.04 (2012);

supra note 241 and accompanying text.
329. See, e.g., WILKES-BARRE, § 7-219; see also EAST ROCHESTER, N.Y., § 144-13-A(5)(a)
(stating that the ordinance is violated when one of the three CNO citations becomes a conviction).
330. See supra Part H.A.
331. Potential costs may include attorney fees or looking for alternative housing.
332. See Scherer, supranote 161, at 559-60.
333. See, e.g., WILKES-BARRE, § 7-219; see supranote 324 and accompanying text.
334. See supra notes 330, 332-34 and accompanying text.
335. See, e.g., WILKES-BARRE, § 7-219; see supra note 324 and accompanying text.
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police and successfully prosecuted or a guilty plea entered before a
district justice. '336 This addition would simply delay the initiation 33of7
eviction proceedings until the tenant's citation is tried and upheld.
Once the tenant is convicted of violating a CNO in a court of law, the
municipality or the landlord can justifiably begin the eviction process.338
This procedure will guarantee that the tenant has the right to be heard at
the proper time and place.339
C. Providingfor JudicialReview of DiscretionaryDecisions
Before a NeutralDecision-Maker Will Make Certain that
No Innocent Tenant Is Harmed
Currently, the majority of CNO jurisdictions provide the chief of
police with the sole right to determine what conduct is considered
"disruptive" 340 and when a property should be considered a chronic
nuisance.341 Once the chief of police determines that the property is a
chronic nuisance, the abatement process begins.342 Logically, this means
that it is in the chief of police's sole discretion when the abatement
process begins,343 and no unbiased individual can subsequently review
this determination. 344 This is problematic because many CNOs do not
describe in detail the type of conduct that can qualify as disruptive.345
Therefore, any conduct can be considered disruptive, in hindsight, and
this can lead to the use of the CNO as a weapon.3 46 For example, it is
plausible that the chief of police will declare any conduct
of a
3 47
her.
for
in"
it
"has
she
if
disruptive
be
to
tenant
cited
persistently
336.
337.
338.
339.

WILKES-BARRE, § 7-219.
See supra notes 327-35 and accompanying text.
See supranote 329 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 309-35 and accompanying text.

340. See, e.g., BOROUGH OF NORRISTOWN, PA., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 245, art. I, § 245-3(C)
(2012).
341. See, e.g., SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE tit. 10, ch. 10.09, § 10.09.030(A) (2009).
342. See, e.g., id. §§ 10.09.030(A)-(D).
343. See supra notes 341-43 and accompanying text.
344. Compare SEATTLE, WASH., § 10.09.030-035 (failing to provide the landlord or tenant
with an appeal option), with PITTSBURGH, PA., CODE OF ORDINANCES art. VII, ch. 670, § 670.05
(2007) (providing the landlord with an option to appeal the declarations).
345. Compare CITY OF YORK, PA., CODIFIED ORDINANCES pt. 17, tit. 3, art. 1751, § 1751.03
(2012); MILWAUKEE, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 80, § 80-10-2(c) (2001); SEATTLE, WASH.,
§ 10.09.010(5), and TOWN/VILLAGE OF EAST ROCHESTER, N.Y., CODE, ch. 144, § 144-2 (2009),
with TOWN OF BLOOMSBURG, PA., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 6, pt. 6, § 6-602 (2003) (penalizing any
"conduct which otherwise disturbs, annoys, injures or endangers the health, safety or welfare of the
residents of Bloomsburg"), and NORRISTOWN, PA., § 245-3(B).
346. See Verified Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1,
209-16; Motion to Dismiss,
supranote 120, at 55-57; supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
347. See Verified Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, IN 209-16; Motion to Dismiss,
supranote 120, at 55-57; supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
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The Supreme Court has warned the legislature about unfettered
discretion of governmental parties.348 For example, in the category of
First Amendment law, the Supreme Court has struck down multiple state
ordinances that reserved sole discretion of the right to exercise speech
for the hands of the chief of police. 349 In Saia v. New York, 350 the state
embraced a municipal ordinance which "forb[ids] the use of sound
amplification devices except with permission of the Chief of Police."35 '
If the chief did not like your viewpoint, for any reason, she could deny
your right to speech, and her determination could not be appealed or
reversed. 352 This meant that the right to be heard, and the right to First
Amendment speech, was placed in the hands of one official who could
decide to give permission to the views that she appreciated and deny
permission to the views that she disliked.3 53 After declaring the
ordinance to be a prior restraint on free speech,354 the Court noted that
providing a state official with unfettered discretion invites abuse and
potentially usurps a citizen's protected First Amendment right. 355 The
same is true in CNO jurisdictions where providing the chief of police
with the sole discretion as to when conduct becomes "disorderly," or
when a property is declared a chronic nuisance,356 invites the
officer's potential abuse and usurps a tenant's protected liberty and
property interests.3 57
Considering that courts have been able to interpret statutes and
declare conduct to be a nuisance since English common law,358 it should
not be a hefty burden on a municipality for a judge to review and modify
the chief of police's nuisance determinations. However, this review
cannot come after each of the determinations in their own external

348. See, e.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 560-62 (1948) (striking down a state municipal
ordinance prohibiting the use of loudspeakers without first obtaining permission from the chief of
police, who retained unfettered discretion in the permit determination).
349. See id.
350. 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
351. Seeid.at558.
352. See id.at 562.
353. See id.
354. See id.at 559-60.

at 562.
355. See id.
356. See, e.g.,
BOROUGH OF NORRISTOWN, PA., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 245, art. I, § 245-3(C)
(2012); SEATrLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE tit. 10, ch. 10.09, § 10.09.030(A) (2009); see Verified
Second Amended Complaint, supranote 1, 209-16; Motion to Dismiss, supra note 120, at 55-57;
supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
357. See supra Part III.A.
358.

See supra Part H.A.
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hearings, because this would lead to hundreds of hearings and thousands
of dollars in litigation costs. 359 Any effort to create a new hearing as a
safeguard would cause a spike in the demand for such hearings, thereby
causing a delay in litigation and eviction proceedings, as well as an
increase in municipal costs. 3 60 Nor can the opportunity to be heard wait
until the commencement of the eviction proceedings, because that could
lead to the initiation of eviction proceedings against innocent, nonconvicted tenants.36' Ideally, the review by a neutral decision-maker
must come at the time when the tenant is contesting her administered
strike because a hearing has already been scheduled,362 all of the
necessary witnesses are already in court, 36 3 and a neutral judge is capable
of interpreting a statute and making the final determination. 3 No
additional municipal funds would need to be expended on an external
hearing, and no innocent tenant would be placed in harm's way.
Like the aforementioned neutral decision-maker, a judge utilizing
the Mathews test is likely to recognize that there is a great interest at
risk,365 and that the early, unjustified initiation of eviction proceedings
against an innocent tenant is likely to cost a lot of time, money, and
mental anguish, all of which are irreversible. 366 Finally, a judge is likely
to weigh those facts against the fact that there is a great chance of abuse
of power by the chief of police, 367 and that there is a relatively low
burden in delaying the eviction process until a neutral magistrate can
determine whether the tenant's conduct was, in fact, a "disruptive"
nuisance activity. 368 After considering all of the above factors, and
balancing them in the Mathews test, a court is likely to conclude that the
factors weigh in favor of the tenant, and that there is no sufficient reason

359.
360.
361.
362.

See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347 (1976).
See id.
See supra notes 329, 332-33 and accompanying text.
See WILKES-BARRE, PA., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 7, art. VII, § 7-219 (2005) (requiring

that citation turn into a conviction or a guilty plea before counting it as a strike). In citation hearings
in Wilkes-Barre, it is likely that the citing officer will take the stand and the tenant is given the
opportunity to plead her defenses. See id. Upon a finding of guilty or a guilty plea, the citation is
counted as a strike. Id. When trying the citation, the judge is best suited to decide whether the
conduct constituted disruptive conduct and is worthy of a strike. See id.
363. See id.
364. See id For those jurisdictions that provide a landlord with the opportunity to appeal the
chief of police's declaration before the abatement process, a tenant should be able to appeal the
declaration to the board without waiting for the eviction proceeding to assert her argument. Id.
365. See supra Part III.A.
366. See supra notes 329, 332-33 and accompanying text.
367. See supra notes 341-58 and accompanying text.
368. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347 (1976); WILKES-BARRE, § 7-219.
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for a municipality to begin the eviction process without waiting
for the three disruptive conduct strikes to be reviewed by a neutral
decision-maker.369
The inclusion of the following statement can resolve the CNO
judicial review issue: "The Chief of Police's determination as to a
property's nuisance status, or conduct that is later determined to have
violated this chapter, is reviewable by a court of law at the time of the
citation's hearing., 370 By adding such a term, a judge would be able to:
hear the tenant's defenses at the proper time; try the tenant for the strike
received; 371 review whether the tenant's conduct was truly disruptive;
hear the tenant's defenses; and review whether the property was
justifiably declared a chronic nuisance property. 372
V.

CONCLUSION

Tenants do not currently receive notice of a CNO strike, or notice
that the property they are inhabiting was declared a chronic nuisance.373
Nor do they receive an opportunity to be included in the abatement
3 74
process, contest the property's declaration, or contest the strike.

Finally, the tenants do not have the opportunity to appeal the chief of
police's decision on the property's classification, or to appeal the
determination that the tenant's conduct was "disruptive."' 375 Therefore,
they are being deprived of property without being given an opportunity
to be heard.376

With the implementation of the suggested ordinance modifications,
it is possible to protect tenants and municipal public funding, all at the
same time.377 Municipalities simply must include a tenant's right to

notice378 and judicial review of an officer's nuisance determination,3 79
and require a guilty finding on a tenant's strike in order to satisfy the due

369.

Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; see supra notes 366-69 and accompanying text; supra Part

III.A.

370. See WILKES-BARRE, § 7-219.
371.

See supra Part V.B.

372. See supra notes 275-372 and accompanying text.
373. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
374. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
375. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
376.
377.
378.
379.

See supra Part
See supra Part
See supra Part
See supra Part

III.A.
IV.
M A.
IV.C.
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process requirement.38 ° Municipalities that continue to evict or fine
tenants without proper process are violating the Fourteenth Amendment,
and their ordinances should be unenforceable.3 81
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